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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from judgment rendered in the Third Judicial 
District Court, J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, sitting without a jury, 
dated April 6, 1990, in favor of Defendant against both Intervenor 
and the Plaintiff, no cause of action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Intervenor, in their jointly-filed brief, state 
two grounds for their appeal of the decision of Judge Frederick, 
namely, (1) the decision is contrary to the evidence, and (2) the 
decision is contrary to our state statutes and the decisions of 
this court. 
The standard for review of a trial court's findings of fact 
is set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), as 
follows: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility 
of witnesses. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, in the case of Grayson 
Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470 (Utah 
1989) : 
A trial court's legal conclusions are accorded no 
particular deference; we review them for correctness. 
(Citations) To successfully attack a court's findings 
of fact, an appellant must first marshall all the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate 
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that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack under the Rule 52(a) standard. Re id 
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P. 2d 896, 899 (Utah 
1989); In Re: Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Title 75-6-103 (1) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
provides: 
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all 
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless 
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different 
intent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. This case involves a controversy 
over the ownership of two savings certificates owned by Milton J. 
Hiltsley, deceased (hereinafter "Hiltsley") , during his lifetime, 
and left at his death in the joint names of himself and Defendant 
(Ex. 3P and Ex. 4P) , and one passbook savings account (Ex. 5P) , the 
proceeds of which were disposed of by Hiltsley during his lifetime 
to help purchase a condominium for Defendant (Ex. 10P, page 253), 
which was placed in the names of Defendant and Hiltsley as joint 
tenants with rights of survivorship. (R. 583) 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. This action was originally 
commenced by Plaintiff, for herself and in her capacity as personal 
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representative of her deceased husband, Hiltsley, against 
Defendant, claiming alienation of her husband's affections, fraud 
and undue influence. (R. 583) 
The Third Judicial District Court, Bryant H. Croft, Judge, 
after a non-jury trial, rendered judgment awarding Plaintiff 
$4,924.66, and awarding the Estate of Etta Wood, a non-party, the 
sum of $43,623.43, and impressing a constructive trust on the 
certificates and the condominium in support thereof. (R. 97-99) 
On appeal by Defendant, the Supreme Court reversed the case 
and remanded it to the district court "for joinder of Etta Wood's 
estate". (R. 584) 
Etta Wood's personal representative was joined as a party, and 
then filed his Complaint in Intervention, seeking a money judgment 
against Hiltsley and the impressing of a constructive trust on the 
certificates and condominium against Defendant. (R. 589-593) Cross 
motions for summary judgment were thereafter filed by Intervenor 
and by Defendant (R. 601-603 & 614-615), and the Court, J. Dennis 
Frederick, Judge, granted Defendant's motion and denied the motion 
of Intervenor (R. 620-621). On appeal filed by Intervenor and 
Plaintiff, case number 890181-CA, the Utah Court of Appeals, in an 
unpublished decision, "reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings." (R.632) 
C. DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW. The trial on remand in this 
matter was held before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, who, 
after conclusion thereof, rendered his decision granting judgment 
for Defendant against both Intervenor and Plaintiff, no cause of 
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action. (R. 686-687) It is that judgment which is now the subject 
of this appeal by Intervenor and Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Etta Wood was the sister of Hiltsley and died on January 
10, 1980. (R. 583) 
2. Hiltsley later died on August 26, 1981. (R. 583) 
3. At the time of Hiltsley's death, the savings certificate 
at American Savings and Loan Association, number 11-013277-9 (Ex. 
4P) and the savings certificate at Prudential Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, number 003-300723-6 (Ex. 3P) were held in the 
joint names of Hiltsley and Defendant as joint tenants. (R. 583) 
4. On October 29, 1979, Hiltsley withdrew all funds in the 
passbook account at American Savings and Loan Association (Ex. 5P) 
(R. Second Trial Transcript, pp.60-61) and used such proceeds to 
help Defendant purchase a condominium which was placed in the joint 
names of Defendant and Hiltsley. (Ex. 9) Said savings account, at 
the time of withdrawal, was held in the names of Hiltsley, 
Plaintiff and Defendant, as joint tenants. (R. Second Trial 
Transcript, p.48) 
5. That an entry in Hiltsley's journal (Ex. 10) on page 253, 
under date of October 5, 1979, states: 
Received money from Etta's account, transferred to Salt 
Lake from Albuquerque, N M, $30,000, plus 314- a 
shortage of $8.+. The AM Savings wiLl check this shortage 
for me- Placed- $11,000.00 in Savings passbook, 
$10,000.00 in money market at AM Savings, $10,000.00 in 
money market @ PFS." (Ex. 10P, page 253) 
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6. The Plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal from 
these certificates and passbook account, and had no knowledge of 
them until shortly after Hiltsley's death. (R. 57-61, and 185-186) 
7. At the trial, no evidence was presented that would enable 
the court to determine that Hiltsley exercised dominance, undue 
influence or inappropriate influence over Etta Wood or her 
property. (R. 679-680) 
8. At the trial, no evidence was elicited as to why the money 
was provided to Hiltsley or in what capacity he held or received 
it. (R. 680) 
9. That there was insufficient evidence produced at trial 
to support the judgment of Judge Croft in favor of Plaintiff (R. 
680) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Plaintiff and Intervenor not only failed to establish 
by clear and convincing evidence the elements of a constructive 
trust, they failed to present any such evidence. 
2. The trial court, Judge Frederick, correctly applied the 
law as to the claim of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and 
as to ownership of joint bank accounts, and specifically the law 
of this case on constructive trusts as given it on reversal and 
remand by the Utah Supreme Court in Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 
1024 (Utah 1987) . 
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3. The appeal of Plaintiff and Intervenor is without merit, 
having no legal or factual basis, the evidence and law are 
misstated and mischaracterized in their Brief filed on appeal, and 
Defendant is entitled to sanctions and damages as provided by the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF AND INTERVENOR HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE 
ELEMENTS OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
Intervenor and Plaintiff have failed to sustain their burden 
of proof to support a claim of a constructive trust. The trial 
court, Judge Frederick, so found. (R. 679-680) Intervenor and 
Plaintiff, at the trial, seemed content to rely upon (1) the 
journal entry of Hiltsley (Exhibit 10-P, page 253), i.e., that he 
had received funds from his sister and had made deposits of those 
funds in several accounts, and (2) the collateral estoppel effect 
of the earlier decision of Judge Croft which had imposed a 
constructive trust on those funds. No additional evidence was 
introduced at the trial before Judge Frederick. (R. Second Trial 
Transcript, p.7) It is further noteworthy that the Complaint in 
Intervention makes no allegation of any fact which would support 
a finding of a constructive trust, except the bare allegation of 
a breach by Hiltsley of a confidential relationship with his 
sister. (R. 590) This was done in total disregard for the 
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instructions on remand given the trial court and counsel in the 
Supreme Court's earlier decision, Hiltsley v. Ryder, supra, in 
footnote 5, as follows: 
In making this disposition, we in no way rule upon 
the merits of the constructive trust issue. To do so 
would be improper since the record was developed without 
representation by Etta Woods' estate. However, for the 
benefit of the trial court, we refer to it Ashton v. 
Ashton. 733 P. 2d 147, 151-52 (Utah 1987), and Baker v. 
Pattee, 684 P. 2d 632, 636, 637 (Utah 1984). (R. 584) 
and the specific instructions given by Justice Zimmerman, in his 
concurring opinion, as follows: 
The burden of proof is upon the one asserting a 
constructive trust to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that equitable grounds for imposing a trust 
exist. Baker v. Pattee. 684 P. 2d 632, 637 (Utah ,1984); 
Carnesecca v. Carnesecca. 572 P. 2d 710; Neilson v. 
Rasmussen. 558 P. 2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976); Matter of 
Estate of Hock. 655 P. 2d 1111, 1114 (Utah (1982). This 
burden cannot be met by simply showing that there was a 
transaction between the parties apparently to the benefit 
of one and that they had a close family relationship. 
(R. 585) 
In the case of Close v. Adams. 657 P. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (Utah 
1983), Justice Durham, writing for an unanimous court states: 
The present case arises out of a dispute over 
ownership of the stock.... In support of her constructive 
trust theory, the respondent claimed that Edith Branscom 
was under the undue influence of the appellant.... This 
Court has previously stated that a "constructive trust 
is an equitable remedy to prevent uniust enrichment." 
In Re: Estate of Hock. Utah. 655 P. 2d 1111, 1114 (1982) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). In In re Estate of 
Hock, this Court continued: 
None of the parties disputes the findings 
that... Ruth did not engage in any fraud, bad 
faith or breach of a fiduciary responsibility. 
In light of this undisputed finding, the 
doctrine of constructive trust is inapplicable. 
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Id, , at 1115. In the present case, the trial 
court's findings do not show that the appellant engaged 
in any fraud or other wrong doing, nor do they establish 
any other grounds for imposing a constructive trust. See 
In re Estate of Hock, supra; Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts §§44 and 45 (1959) ; 5 A. Scott, The Law of Trusts, 
§§461-473 at 3410-53 (1967). In fact, the trial court 
found specifically that Edith Branscom "was free of undue 
influence of the family." As a result, the doctrine of 
constructive trust is inapplicable and the trial court's 
imposition of a constructive trust was in error. We 
therefore reverse the judgment. 
In Estate of Coffin, 671 P. 2d 921 (Ariz. App. 1983), a case 
cited to by Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion in Hiltsley 
v. Ryder, supra, the Court of Appeals of Arizona, in considering 
whether a constructive trust on the assets of the estate should 
have been imposed, held: 
We preliminarily note that there is no allegation 
that the mother promised to reconvey the property to 
appellant, or that the property was conveyed to her 
mother in exchange for a promise to leave the property 
to appellant in her will or make appellant an heir. In 
fact, there is no allegation whatsoever that the mother 
induced appellant in any manner whatsoever to deed the 
property to her. But the crucial omissions in this case 
are allegations of facts which would show a confidential 
relationship. It has long been the law in this state 
that the existence of a family relationship without more 
is not sufficient to create a constructive trust. 
(Citations) In order to impose a constructive trust, in 
addition to the family relationship, there must be shown 
age and infirmity on one hand, actual dominance on the 
part of the grantee, an established course of management 
of the grantors affairs by the grantee, or other similar 
facts making it inequitable to allow the grantee to 
prevail. (Citations) Appellant's reliance solely on the 
relationship of mother and child is insufficient to show 
a confidential relationship and therefore insufficient 
to establish a constructive trust. (Emphasis added) 
Judge Frederick made specific findings that no evidence was 
offered showing dominance, undue influence or inappropriate 
influence, or in what capacity Hiltsley received or held the money. 
8 
(R. 679-680) 
As to the bare allegations contained in Intervener's 
Complaint, that Hiltsley breached his confidential relationship 
with Etta Wood, no evidence was offered at the trial to show a 
confidential relationship. The law with respect to a confidential 
relationship is set forth in the case of Webster v. Lehmer, 724 P. 
2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1987), quoting Bradbury, 16 Utah 2d 383, 401 
P. 2d 713, wherein it is held: 
The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon 
the principal of inequality between the parties, and 
implies a position of superiority occupied by one of the 
parties over the other. 
This holding was followed in the case of Mattes v. Olearain, 
759 P. 2d 1117, 1179 (Utah App. 1988), which case also cited 
Hiltsley v. Ryder, supra, for the position that one must show facts 
indicating grantor's weakness and grantee's dominance to show a 
confidential relationship. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
THE ISSUES RAISED AT TRIAL. 
Plaintiff claims the trial court did not correctly apply the 
law of joint accounts but cites a statute and cases dealing with 
joint ownership of real property. Clearly, such statute and cases 
are irrelevant and immaterial to the ownership of jointly held bank 
accounts and certificates. 
JOINT TENANCY. The law relative to ownership of a joint 
account during the lifetime of the parties thereto is set forth in 
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Title §75-6-103 (1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which 
states: 
A joint account belongs, during the lifetime of all 
parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless 
there is clear and convincing evidence of a different 
intent. 
Title §75-6-101 (6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
defines net contributions as follows: 
"Net contribution" of a party to a joint account as 
of any given time is the sum of all deposits to it made 
by or for him, less all withdrawals made by or for him 
which have not been paid to or applied to the use of any 
other party, plus a prorata share of any interest or 
dividends included in the current balance. The term 
includes, in addition, any proceeds of deposit, life 
insurance added to the account by reason of the death of 
the party whose net contribution is in question. 
As regards the claim of the plaintiff that she had an 
ownership interest in the American Savings and Loan Ass'n account 
closed by Hiltsley during his lifetime, by virtue of the account 
being a "tenancy in common" account, which interest could not be 
alienated by her husband during his lifetime, the account was in 
fact a joint tenancy account (R. Second Trial Transcript p.48), 
and even had it not been, Plaintiff would not have acquired any 
present interest in the account. Defendant refers this court to 
the last two sentences of the Editorial Board Comment following 
Title §75-6-103, wherein it is stated: 
The theory of these sections is that the basic 
relationship of the parties is that of individual 
ownership of values attributable to their respective 
deposits and withdrawals; the right of survivorship which 
attaches unless negated by the form of the account really 
is a right to the values theretofore owned by another 
which the survivor receives for the first time at the 
death of the owner. That is to say, the account operates 
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as a valid disposition at death rather than as a present 
joint tenant, (Emphasis added) 
The Plaintiff had made no deposit to or withdrawal from the 
certificates or savings accounts and she knew nothing of them until 
after Hiltsley's death. (R. 57-61, and 185-186) (R. Second Trial 
Transcript, p.91) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of First Security Bank of 
Utah v. Demiris, 354 P. 2d 97 (Utah 1960) , cites with approval the 
language of the New York case of In re Kelley's Willr (1933), 146 
Misc. 353, 263 N.Y.S. 661, 667: 
The withdrawal of monies from a joint account does 
not destroy a joint tenancy, if one was created. It 
merely opens the doors to competent evidence, if 
available, that no joint tenancy was originally created 
or intended. 
It follows, therefore, that Hiltsley had the absolute right 
to withdraw the monies from his account for purposes satisfactory 
to him and the plaintiff had no interest in those monies unless and 
until the decedent died leaving the account in her joint name. 
With respect to the two savings certificates remaining at 
Hiltsley's death in his name and Defendant's, as joint tenants, 
neither Plaintiff nor Intervenor made any allegation in their 
respective complaints, nor did either offer any evidence at trial, 
of a different intention on the part of Hiltsley than to have the 
surviving joint tenant receive the funds in the savings accounts 
or certificates upon his death. In fact, the Will of the decedent, 
executed August 9, 1978 (Ex.6P), offered into evidence by plaintiff 
states: 
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Thirdly, I direct all savings certificates, savings 
accounts and checking accounts held jointly by myself and 
another, shall become the sole property of such surviving 
co-signer. 
B. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. Res judicata and 
collateral estoppel have no application to the issues presented on 
this appeal. 
It is an elementary rule of law that the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel are not available where the 
decision or judgment upon which they are sought to be applied has 
been reversed. In 50 C.J.S., Judgments §702, p.157, it says: 
A judgment is of no force whatever as an estoppel 
after it has been effectually vacated or annulled, as 
where is has been reversed on appeal, ... 
In 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal & Error, §955, in speaking of the 
general effect of a reversal, the treatise states, at page 382: 
The reversal sets the matter at large for 
read judication of all issues involved in the case and 
recovery may be had in the second trial for items of 
damage not awarded in the first. The case may be retried 
in the light of knowledge acquired since the former 
trial, and defenses not made on the first trial may be 
entertained. All proceedings had under the judgment are, 
as between the immediate parties at least, ipso facto 
void and of no effect. However, the opinion of the court 
on appeal must be followed so far as applicable, for the 
principals of law stated therein must be regarded as the 
law of the case on the second trial. 
In the case of Community Bank v. Vassil, 570 P. 2d 66, 68 
(Ore. 1977), the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon said: 
We need not address the issues raised by Defendant's 
first assignment of error in the present case. Even 
assuming that the issues in the Ell case were the same 
as those in this case (a position that Community Bank 
vigorously opposes and which we adopt only for purposes 
of this discussion), there is at present no judgment in 
the Ell case which can operate as an estoppel against the 
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bank. Upon reversal of the judgment in that case and its 
remand for a new trial, it ceased to have any potential 
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect. Restatement 
of judgments 163, Comment D2 §41 (1942). (Emphasis added) 
See also Sutton v. Hirvonen, 775 P. 2d 448, 452 (Wash. 1989). 
POINT III. 
THE APPEAL FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS BEING FRIVOLOUS, 
THE BRIEF FILED ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE 
DISREGARDED, AND DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED DEFENDANT. 
Of the 23 cases cited by appellants in their brief, 
approximately one-third relate to res judicata and collateral 
estoppel which, as pointed out above, are irrelevant and immaterial 
to any issue raised by the appeal. Of the 18 pages contained in 
Appellants7 Brief, one-half (9 pages) deal substantially with the 
matter of res judicata and collateral estoppel. There are ten (10) 
or more misstatements of fact or mischaracterizations of the law 
in the Brief, of which the following are a few prime examples: 
At the top of page 2 of the Brief: 
Trial court refused to recognize the decision of 
Judge Croft awarding Plaintiff Ruth Hiltsley judgment in 
the amount of $4,924.66, which judgment has never been 
overturned or on which there has been no contrary 
evidence submitted since the trial before Judge Croft. 
(Emphasis added) 
Judge Croft's decision relating to such award to Plaintiff, 
was based upon a finding that Plaintiff had an interest in the 
account as a tenant in common. This Court need only refer to the 
decision of the Supreme Court in remanding the case to the trial 
court in Hiltsley, supra, which reversed and remanded the case for 
joinder of the Etta Wood estate, and the testimony of Ms. Macias, 
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called to testify in the trial before Judge Frederick, in answer 
to Mr. King's question: 
Q And the signature card shows that what, is this a— 
this does not show—does it show a joint tenancy or— 
A Yes, it is a joint tenancy account. It's a passbook 
savings that—the number in the book indicate that it is 
a passbook. The ownership is M. J. Hiltsley, Ruth 
Hiltsley and H. M. Ryder. (R. Second Trial Transcript, 
p.48) 
At the bottom of page 3 of the Brief, in referring to the 
assets of Etta Wood: 
... which were given by him during his lifetime to 
Defendant Hallalene M. Ryder. 
It is uncontested that two of the three accounts were left to 
Defendant as a surviving joint tenant, at Hiltsley's death, not 
given to her during Hiltsley's lifetime. 
In several places, most notably, pages 9 and 15 of the Brief, 
it states that Judge Croft's decision concerning a tracing of funds 
has not been controverted or ever disputed. The Court is referred 
to Defendant's Brief, earlier filed in the Utah Supreme Court on 
the first appeal, specifically Point IB, pages 9-14, which argues 
the insufficiency of the evidence used by Judge Croft in support 
of his decision tracing the funds. 
At the top of page 15 of Appellant's Brief, the case of First 
Security Bank v. Demiris, 10 Ut. 2d 405, 354 P. 2d 97, is referred 
to as holding that a wife's withdrawal of funds from a joint 
account "severed the joint tenancy and the husband could then show 
ownership of the whole account deposited from his independent 
funds." 
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Counsel has misstated the court's holding. The language of 
First Security Bank v. Demiris, supra, at page 99, cites the 
following statement found in In re Kelley's Will, (1933) 146 Misc. 
353, 263 N.Y.S. 661, 667: 
The withdrawal of monies from a joint account does 
not destroy a joint tenancy, if one was created. It 
merely opens the door to competent evidence, if 
available, that no joint tenancy was originally created 
or intended. 
The Utah Supreme Court in referring to such holding of the New 
York case said, at page 99 "The above rule and the reasons 
supporting it are applicable to the instant case." 
At the top of page 16 of the Brief, it states: 
Both appellants join in the proposition that the 
determination by Judge Croft of the rights of the parties 
to the funds that were in the hands of deceased and 
disposed of by him during his lifetime became a final 
disposition of this matter when the Supreme Court did not 
reverse the decision of Croft and remitted the matter for 
the joinder of Etta Wood's estate. 
and on page 17: 
Judge Croft's decision, while returned to the trial 
court for the joinder of Etta Wood's estate as a party, 
has never been reversed or modified in its primary and 
fundamental holdings. There has never been a claim made 
that he erroneously interpreted the law or found facts 
which were not supported by evidence. 
As stated above, these are only some of the examples of the 
misstatement of fact and mischaracterization of law found in the 
Brief. 
Rule 24 (k) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure under the 
title "Requirements and Sanctions" states as follows: 
All briefs under this rule must be concise. 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial 
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or scandalous matter. Briefs which are not in compliance 
may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorneys' fees 
against the offending lawyer. (Emphasis added) 
Rule 3 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
as follows: 
Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court 
determines that a motion made or an appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages, which may include single or double 
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party. The court may order that 
the damages be paid by the party or the party's attorney. 
In the case of O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P. 2d 306 (Utah App. 
1987), Justice Davidson, writing for the Court, at pages 3 09-310, 
stated: 
PLaintiff requests attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to this appeal. This court in Eames v. Eames, 
735 P. 2d 395, 398 (Utah App. 1987), awarded attorney 
fees in a situation in which the "totality of defendant's 
argument" caused us to believe the appeal was frivolous. 
That alone meets the technical requirements of R. Utah 
Ct. App. 33(a).... For purposes of Rule 33(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we define a "frivolous 
appeal" as one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis as defined in Rule 40(a) .... Defendant's claims on 
appeal simply controvert the findings of the court. The 
claims are not only without merit but are also without 
basis in law or fact. Plaintiff is entitled to the 
benefit of Rule 33(a). (Emphasis added) 
In Porco v. Porco, 752 P. 2d 365 (Utah App. 1988)., Justice 
Garff, writing for the court, at page 3 69 stated: 
However, sanctions should be imposed when "an appeal 
is obviously without any merit and has been taken with 
no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in 
delayed implementation of the judgment of the lower 
court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of 
the time and resources of the lower court. (Emphasis 
added) 
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In the case of Eames v. Eames, 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah App. 
1987)., Justice Davidson, writing for the court, stated: 
The court recognizes the right of a party to argue 
in an attempt to correct what that party deems to be 
error in the court below. However, when there is no 
basis for the argument presented and when the evidence 
or law is mischaracterized and misstated, the court must 
question the party's motives. (Emphasis added) 
The same problems found in the Utah Court of Appeals decisions 
above are also found in the appeal of Plaintiff and Intervenor. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court in the trial on remand from 
the Utah Supreme Court should be affirmed, the Brief filed by 
Appellant should be stricken; the appeal should be determined to 
be frivolous, and Defendant should be awarded damages including 
double costs and attorneys' fees against Plaintiff, Intervenor, and 
their counsel. 
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